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Abstract
A common argument for the lack of economic reform in developing countries is popular
opposition. If current economic policies are dysfunctional, could information about alterna-
tives sway the voters? We examine if a simple argument emphasizing the need to increase
electricity prices for improved supply can change public opinion in the case of India’s power
sector reforms. The evidence comes from a survey experiment in rural Uttar Pradesh, which
is both India’s largest state and has one of the lowest levels of household electrification. As
expected, people respond to information about the relationship between electricity pricing,
capacity investment, and reliability of supply by increasing their support for higher prices.
However, no corresponding increase is observed for privatization of electricity generation.
For external validity, we analyze an existing national survey on electricity privatization from
2004–2005, finding patterns that support our argument.
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1 Introduction
For decades, India has suffered from an inefficient power sector that frequently fails to generate the
electricity that the country needs for economic growth and wellbeing. The situation is especially dire
in rural areas. Not only are electrification rates low, but the electricity grid frequently fails to provide
a reliable supply of power when people need it. The latest census data indicate that every third Indian
remains without access to electricity even for basic household services (Government of India, 2011a), and
in some major states such as Bihar the situation is much worse.
Why has India failed to improve reliable rural electricity supply? One popular hypothesis for In-
dia’s failure to reform the power sector is popular opposition to increased electricity tariffs (i.e. pricing),
especially among influential segments such as farmers who own electrified water pumps (Lal, 2006; San-
thakumar, 2008). In this telling, large segments of the Indian population oppose higher electricity tariffs.
Even if they are interested in the improved reliability of power supply, they may worry that the state’s
promise that reform improves service is not credible. As Lal (2006: 24) puts it, the state “has failed to carry
credible assurances” that the reform will actually improve customer service. A related issue is the lack of
capital investment by the private sector (Singh, 2006; Szakonyi and Urpelainen, 2013). While the lack of
cash flow from consumers due to low prices is a central problem, it might be reduced if private companies
invested in the power sector. While private utilities may also wish to increase tariffs, they could plausibly
improve quality because their profits depend on the provision of a good service.
Is there any hope for change? Could new information about the potential benefits of reform sway the
Indian public to support a financially sustainable power sector? If so, under what conditions? The provi-
sion of information is often assumed to be a key determinant of public opinion (Barabas and Jerit, 2010;
Jerit and Barabas, 2006; Prior and Lupia, 2008; Alvarez and Brehm, 2002), but we know little about its role
in individual preferences over energy issues and development policies more generally. We hypothesize
that an argument emphasizing the direct effect of higher electricity tariffs on the reliability of supply will
be powerful in India. Higher electricity tariffs improve the financial situation of the electricity suppliers,
thus releasing funds for capacity investment. Improved capacity, in turn, allows a more reliable supply to
customers. This goes against the conventional wisdom that people prefer low prices and reforms can only
succeed “by stealth” (Jenkins, 1999; Varshney, 1998).
In answering this question, it is important to recall that pricing reform is not the same as privatization.
In principle, public power generation companies can increase their electricity tariffs and invest the revenue
in improved capacity and distribution. Since power sector privatization is politically controversial in
India (Lal, 2006; Santhakumar, 2008), we distinguish between privatization and increased electricity tariffs.
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Even if privatization fails to garner public support, a pricing reform may prove popular. We separately
investigate the effect of pro-reform information on support for pricing reform versus privatization.
To test the argument, we report empirical results from a survey experiment in rural Uttar Pradesh
on building public support for higher electricity tariffs in India. The experiment was conducted on a
convenience sample of 593 subjects in the Shahjahanpur district of Uttar Pradesh in the spring of 2013.
This location of the experiment is interesting for several reasons. First, Uttar Pradesh has one of the lowest
electrification rates in the country, with only 37% of households relying on grid electricity for lighting
(Government of India, 2011a). Second, the quality of electricity supply is poor. On average, a household
in Uttar Pradesh has about 9 hours of electricity per day; this number drops to 7 hours for households
located in rural regions (Desai et al., 2007). Finally, the villages where the survey was conducted were
electrified only a few months before the survey. Therefore, electricity is a salient topic and we have a
relatively even split of electrified and unelectrified households in the sample.
The findings testify to the power of new information. Since the villagers consider power supply to be
the government’s responsibility, a clear majority of the sample opposes privatization of power generation,
and our arguments have little effects on our respondents. However, once the positive relationship between
higher electricity tariffs and improved service quality is explained, respondents strongly favor a price
increase. Specifically, the information treatment significantly increases support for higher prices by 0.45
points, on average, on a 0–4 response scale. Given that the treatment is a simple script with information,
this treatment effect in the order of 10% is substantively important. Not only do people seem to under-
stand and believe that higher prices encourage capacity investment, but this information was sufficiently
powerful to create public support for price increases. This is all the more remarkable, given that 70% of
our respondents already had an electricity connection and would have to pay higher prices.
Since the experiment was conducted on a convenience sample, it is important to conduct further
analysis on the generalizability of the findings. To this end, we analyzed public opinion data on power
sector reform supplied by Santhakumar (2008) in a national survey of India conducted in 2004–2005.
This survey reflects public opinion about electricity privatization in 13 major Indian states, with Orissa
excluded because privatization had already been implemented in 1996. We show that the patterns which
our theory predicts can also be found in this data set. While opposition to privatization is strong, people
who experienced increases in prices tended to be more favorable to further price increases, suggesting that
they witnessed the improvement of electricity quality obtained by their contribution. Additionally, more
educated individuals, who presumably are better informed about the benefits of cost recovery in pricing,
are willing to pay higher tariffs.
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The article offers a dual contribution to the social sciences. First, we add to the body of literature on
economic reform by showing that new information about the benefits of higher prices can have notable
effects on public opinion. This complements the finding in Baker (2003) that people do support economic
reforms if it is in their direct self-interest. We show that the lack of support for efficient economic reforms
could simply reflect the public’s lack of awareness of the benefits of the reform, as opposed to insistence
on low prices and generous subsidies. Moreover, our finding on the importance of distinguishing between
price increases and privatization suggests that conflating popular and unpopular elements of economic
reform in public communication can dilute the effectiveness of new information.
Second, the findings have important implications for the politics of power sector reform in India. The
role of popular opposition to electricity reform remains debated in the literature (Lal, 2006; Santhakumar,
2008). Our findings support Lal’s (2006) view that while people do appreciate the benefits of enhanced
power generation, they worry that the reforms may not deliver. This interpretation is warranted because
the argument we tested does not require a complex implementation strategy by the state. Enhanced
revenue allows increased capacity investment by the power sector, and this results in improved supply.
Our argument goes against Jenkins’s (1999) general argument that reforms in India often progress “by
stealth.” Our findings suggest that policymakers can build popular support for higher electricity tariffs
and, in so doing, overcome entrenched interests.
A reform strategy that emphasizes these benefits, while downplaying privatization, could be effective,
provided the challenges of regulatory reform are not forgotten (Dubash and Rao, 2008). This recommen-
dation is in line with findings from a volume edited by Victor and Heller (2007) on power sector reforms
in developing countries. The studies in that volume show that full privatization is rare outside the tradi-
tional industrialized countries, and most governments have opted for a “hybrid” solution of independent
regulation without full privatization. Our findings suggest that this strategy could garner popular support
among rural Indians.
The relevance of this argument, of course, depends on the role that the mass public plays in the
politics of reform. In some cases, it could be that the mass public ultimately plays a relatively small role
in determining reform. Some India experts have argued, for example, that the most influential opponents
of power sector reform are interest groups such as utility employees and large farmers who own electric
pumpsets (Lal, 2006). As Dubash and Rajan (2001: 3369) put it, “even though the constituents who stand
most to gain from the supply of free electricity may be in the minority, they have appeared thus far to be
those who maintain just enough swing power to capture the attention of most political parties.” According
to Jenkins (1999), governments can also avoid dealing with public opinion by implementing reforms “by
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stealth.” More generally, the importance of public opinion for reforms may vary across countries, issue
areas, and time (Varshney, 1998). Our findings indicate that governments may be able to generate public
support among the mass public through information provision, but it remains to be seen if this can, in
contexts like India, result in the kind of mass mobilization that would allow power sector reform to move
forward.
2 Electricity Provision in Rural India: Inadequate Supply, Lacking Reform
In India, electricity provision has long suffered from major problems (Varshney, 1998; Rajan, 2000; Bhat-
tacharya and Patel, 2007). According to the 2011 Census of India, one-half of rural India has no access to
electricity at all (Government of India, 2011a). Worse, even if villages are electrified, the quality of service
is low. Hansen and Bower (2003), for instance, report that it is common for farmers to have access to elec-
tricity only for 4–6 hours a day. To address the unequal development of urban and rural power supply, the
Electricity Act1 and the Ministry of Power’s Rural Electrification Policy2 were adopted to bring in private
investment (Sharma, Nair, and Balasubramanian, 2005).
By unbundling State Electricity Boards (SEBs) and opening the power sector for private investors,
policymakers wanted to promote access to and the quality of power supply (Singh, 2006). Since reducing
energy poverty and improving the availability of electricity requires massive investment, attracting private
power generation is often perceived as one way forward (Dubash and Rajan, 2001). With the largely
bankrupt Indian SEBs in mind, whose total debt already amounted to about Rs 415 billion (US$ 7 billion)
in 2001 (Bhattacharya and Patel, 2007: 219), opening the electricity market to private players seems to kill
two birds with one stone. Private electricity producers would relieve SEBs from investing into electricity
generation, while forthcoming private investments would promote electricity access and improve service
quality (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001).
Privatization of electricity markets differs across Indian states, with Orissa and Dehli having sought
full privatization of production, transmission, and distribution early (Thakur, Deshmukh, and Kaushik,
2006). Other states have restricted privatization to power generation exclusively or shunned it altogether
(Shukla et al., 2004; Bhattacharya and Patel, 2007; Dossani, 2004). Despite attempts to reform Indian
electricity markets, major blackouts in recent years show that the reliability and quality of Indian power
remains problematic.
The literature on India’s power sector reforms reports that “disappointing results [of electricity market
1See http://cercind.gov.in/08022007/Act-with-amendment.pdf for the full text of the 2003 Electricity Act.
Accessed on November 19, 2012.
2See http://www.powermin.nic.in/JSP_SERVLETS/internal.jsp for the Ministry of Power’s website on rural
electrification. Accessed on July 24, 2013.
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reform] have often resulted from a narrow focus on finance and cost recovery” (Williams and Ghanadan,
2006: 815). To reform electricity markets, “technical capacity, institutional legitimacy, and democratic
legitimacy” (Dubash and Rao, 2008: 321) are needed in addition to economic resources. Solutions that
ignore social and environmental dimensions will not be enough for transforming India’s electricity market
(Dubash, 2003; Yi-chong, 2006).
An alternative route for improving service quality of power supply in India is a comprehensive pricing
reform without privatization. Failure to raise sufficient revenues prevents public investment into power
generation, causing unreliable electricity provision. Therefore, a broader revenue base is needed. As long
as low tariffs (especially agricultural), electricity theft, and unmetered use preclude SEBs from operating
with reasonable profit margins (Joseph, 2010; Tongia, 2004), investment in badly needed power generation
capacity will not be forthcoming. If tariffs were increased due to a pricing reform, SEBs would have more
financial resources at their disposal to invest into transmission and distribution infrastructure.
Although pricing reform has potential to bring about considerable improvements in India’s electricity
markets, especially in terms of the reliability of service, policy reforms in democracies require the sup-
port of an electoral majority (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998). Increasing
electricity tariffs is itself not a popular policy, and the more so if artificially low electricity tariffs are used
by incumbents to generate votes (Dubash and Rajan, 2001; Bhattacharya and Patel, 2007). However, even
though electricity is provided at prices below competitive market rates, electricity consumers incur an
implicit cost due to unreliable electricity service. As this cost is increasing over time (Bose et al., 2006),
emphasizing the positive connection between service quality and higher tariffs may ultimately convince
voters to favor higher electricity tariffs, thereby enabling electricity pricing reform. We now discuss the
theoretical foundations of popular support and opposition to electricity pricing reform.
3 Theory and Hypotheses
Why do people in India oppose economic reform despite everyday experience with the inefficiencies of
the current system? We present a theory that distinguishes between public opinion about two issues:
privatization and the rational pricing of electricity based on cost recovery. For this, we define prices
to be consistent with cost recovery when they enable electric utilities to invest in electricity generation,
transmission, and distribution, so that reliable power supply could be ensured in the medium to long run.
We argue that while the Indian people have severe reservations about privatization due to their concerns
about unfairness and inequity, they are willing to accept the high tariffs implied by the rational pricing of
electricity provided that they understand the relationship between tariffs and the quality of supply.
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To ensure a good fit between the theory and empirics, the argument is phrased in terms of the power
sector. We also focus on the rural context, where electricity access is more severe than in urban areas,
because that is where our data analysis is focused. Although the theory is focused on explaining the
Indian situation, there are reasons to believe it applies more broadly. Electricity is a basic household
commodity that greatly increases the convenience and productivity of everyday life (Cabraal, Barnes, and
Agarwal, 2005; Dinkelman, 2011). Electricity enables basic lighting, mobile charging, radio or television,
and thus paves the way for higher productivity and higher life quality. Therefore, households around the
world should share the Indian population’s interest in improved electricity supply.
3.1 Centrality of State Responsibility
Our first proposition is that rural villagers in India should have a strong preference for state intervention
in the electricity sector. Building on the literature on economic reform, we argue that large segments
of the population are concerned about privatization because they fear it prompts excessively high prices
and inequitable supply. As Santhakumar (2003) argues, electricity privatization in India would induce
power utilities to implement a strategy of cost recovery, adjusting electricity tariffs to ensure profits. If
the Indian public believes that the strategy of cost recovery would result in significantly higher tariffs
without any accompanying improvements in electricity services, then opposing privatization would be
a rational position to hold. Following this logic, a state’s failure to offer a reliable supply of electricity
would be a smaller problem than the dual problem of higher electricity prices and problematic supply
under privatization.
While this hypothesis has not been investigated in detail for the power sector, there is some evidence
that the concern applies to privatization more generally. Denisova et al. (2012: 45) show that in 28 post-
communist countries, people commonly contest the legitimacy of past privatization rounds, believing
“they failed to obtain their fair share from the initial round of privatization.” Applied to the case of the
Indian power sector, people would contest the legitimacy of a privatization strategy that they perceived
to increase income inequality and to result in an income transfer from the large masses of poor to the
wealthy owners of power utilities.
In the Indian context, the emphasis on the importance of state intervention is also a central element
of much of the public debate. Perhaps most importantly, the Indian debate often emphasizes the idea
of “inclusive growth” as the cornerstone of economic policy (Dre`ze and Sen, 2002). At least since Indira
Gandhi’s emphasis on poverty reduction as the key to economic policy, Indian politicians have campaigned
on policies that redistribute wealth and ensure the inclusion of the poor in the economic growth process.
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One such policy would be the state ownership of basic infrastructure, which would allow the government
to protect the poor from exploitative policies by private businessmen.
Based on these arguments, the first hypothesis from our theory is that people have a strong preference
for state intervention in the electricity sector. If the Indian people worry about the distributive effects of
privatization, they would not support a privatization process. The below hypotheses are written from the
perspective of villagers with weak electricity supply but they also apply to unelectrified households in
villages with electricity since they may expect a grid connection in the future.
Hypothesis 1 (state responsibility for electricity supply). People with weak electricity supply strongly prefer
heavy state intervention in the electricity sector.
Conversely, we also expect people to generally oppose privatization of the power sector. Since priva-
tization is the opposite of heavy intervention, a preference for state responsibility should also induce the
Indian people to oppose privatization itself.
Hypothesis 2 (privatization). People with weak electricity supply strongly oppose privatization.
3.2 Arguments for Higher Electricity Tariffs
Having discussed state responsibility, we now turn to the second prong of our argument. In short, al-
though people prefer state intervention, this need not mean they would not support higher electricity
tariffs based on rational pricing, provided this allows improvements of supply. To begin the argument,
we need to explain the relationship between electricity tariffs and power supply. Crucially for our ar-
gument, this relationship is simple. India’s power utilities, which are responsible for power generation,
are continually on the verge of bankruptcy because they are unable to recover their costs from revenue
(Santhakumar, 2008). If they could raise electricity tariffs and collect them more effectively, they could
meet the investment gap in power generation. This would ensure that there is enough electricity in the
system at peak times, especially at night.
The ties between energy supply, reliability, and price are contentious. An increase of price does not
necessarily translate into better electricity supply. Nonetheless, our argument rests on two relatively
uncontroversial claims. First, in India, electricity supply falls short of demand. This problem is well doc-
umented (Sanghvi, 1983; Ghosh, 2002). Second, this electricity gap can only be solved with consequential
investments in better infrastructure (Thakur et al., 2005). In their current state, most Indian utilities are not
in the position to make these investments. For instance, Ghosh (2002: 128) states that “most of the State
Electricity Boards (SEBs) in India have been suffering from poor operational and financial performances.
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Lower electricity tariffs in the agricultural and domestic sector, which have been cross-subsidized by in-
dustrial sector, encourage the consumers for wasteful use of electricity.” In view of this, it may come at
no surprise that domestic electricity tariffs in states with successful power sector reforms, such as Gujarat
or Maharashtra, were about 15% and 36% higher than the country’s average domestic tariff in 2011–2012
(Government of India, 2011b: 165). Taken together, this suggests that pricing is part of the problem to the
electrification problem. Better pricing is a necessary if not a sufficient condition.
Nothing in this proposition requires privatization. Even if people oppose privatization, they could
still be willing to pay for improved service (Santhakumar, 2008; Bhattacharya and Patel, 2007). Therefore,
an argument can be made that Indian states could solve their financial problems by raising tariffs. The
revenue could be used in direct investments in power generation, which would mitigate the problem
of poor and unreliable supply. While such a strategy would require careful regulation and feature a
different set of challenges (Dubash and Rao, 2008), it would not depend on the politically unpopular act
of privatization.
In essence, this simple argument would appeal to the self-interest of the Indian people. Instead of try-
ing to argue for privatization, policymakers would simply propose higher prices in exchange for improved
supply. Some interest groups, such as large farmers who use electricity for irrigation, might continue to
oppose reform regardless (Lal, 2006; Joseph, 2010). However, those citizens whose specific concern would
be privatization could change their view because their concern would be addressed. Provided that they
would be willing to pay for better service, the proposition above would be a winning one for them. It
is, of course, possible that governments increase tariffs first and then renege on the quality of electricity
supply. However, governments in democracies generally want to provide public goods (independent of
the political party in power) but are unable to do so if they cannot finance such initiatives. That said, we
do not explicitly focus on commitment problems here.
This argument prompts three hypotheses. First, rural Indians should hold a strong preference against
free supply, provided they understand it reduces service quality. Dubash and Rajan (2001: 3369), for
instance, find that “it has even been reported that there is considerable popular opposition among the rural
poor to provide free electricity to farmers...Also, since the quality of power actually delivered to farmers
has for long been extremely poor, it is widely accepted that most farmers are likely to prefer metered and
priced reliable electricity to unmetered free (or low-tariff) unreliable electricity.” Our argument is based
on exactly this idea that people value good quality, which means that they should be opposed to a free
supply of power if they understand the negative effects of free supply on service quality.
Hypothesis 3 (free supply and service quality). People with weak electricity supply strongly oppose free supply
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if they understand it reduces service quality.
Most centrally, we expect new information about the importance of electricity tariff increases for better
supply to be effective in swaying public opinion. A vast and diverse literature contends that information
should play a key role in policy preferences. In fact, it is generally accepted that a democracy requires
well-informed citizens to function properly (Lippman, 1922). However, in practice people are poorly
informed about many important issues, even in countries with modern education systems, such as the
United States (Alvarez and Brehm, 2002). New information can thus be expected to have a considerable
effect in shifting public opinion over public goods. For instance, trade scholars argue that providing infor-
mation to voters will unlock support for free trade: once individuals are made aware of the benefits of free
trade, the argument goes, they will support it (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006). Closer to our argument,
researchers argue that the provision of information shapes energy and environmental preferences, both in
industrialized and developing countries (Aklin and Urpelainen, 2013; Aklin et al., 2013). Similarly, Levine
et al. (1995) underscore the importance in the aftermath of the first oil crisis in 1973 of information pro-
grams about energy efficiency on consumer behavior. The rationale is that individuals do not necessarily
know about the consequences of the status quo, nor are they always aware of the existence of alternative
possible outcomes.
A simple explanation for why increased electricity tariffs benefit service quality should tilt public
opinion toward support for higher prices.
Hypothesis 4 (information, tariffs, and investment). People with weak electricity supply become more supportive
of higher electricity tariffs if the relationship between revenue and service quality is explained.
Given that electrical power is often framed as a fundamental right, we can also scrutinize the public’s
willingness to pay for a good service by examining how their opinion reacts to power being framed as
a universal right. If we are right to argue that people prefer state responsibility for the power sector,
then another argument that could sway their opinion is one based on a rights framing. When electricity
is framed as a universal right, Indians could be more willing to accept price increases because adequate
supply is a key component of state responsibility.
Hypothesis 5 (rights, tariffs, and investment). People with weak electricity supply become more supportive of
higher electricity tariffs if power is framed as a universal right.
Note that these hypotheses do not compete with each other. Both new information and a rights
argument could prove effective, and the relative effectiveness of the arguments is ultimately an empirical
question.
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4 First Test: Experimental Evidence from Rural Uttar Pradesh
To empirically test the hypotheses, we implemented a survey experiment in two villages, Toni and Chhite,
of the Shahjahanpur district in rural Uttar Pradesh. Uttar Pradesh is an excellent site for our theoretical
arguments. It is India’s largest state, with close to 200 million inhabitants. The state electricity sector has
not been privatized, though generation has been unbundled from transmission and distribution, and the
supply-demand gap is acute. Recent census data from 2011 also shows that every third rural dweller has
no access to electricity at all (Government of India, 2011a). Furthermore, survey data shows that even
when electricity is available, access remains poor. An average household in Uttar Pradesh has 9 hours of
electricity per day, and the situation is even worse for an average rural household: the latter only has, on
average, 6 hours of electricity per day (Desai et al., 2007).
We selected the Shahjahanpur district and the two villages in focus to ensure that we would have
both electrified and unelectrified households, while electricity supply would be poor. According to data
collected in 2008 by the Indian Council of Social Science Research, electrification in the Shahjanpur is
particularly low, with 15% of households reporting having access to electricity.3 The two villages had been
electrified in the fall of 2012, or 3–6 months before we conducted our surveys. While it is possible that the
prior lack of electricity in these villages were because of state subsidies in other parts of Uttar Pradesh,
the electrification rate is as high as 70% due to a recent electrification effort in the sample (though about
half of the connections are illegal). The electrified households are also concerned with both the reliability
and the price of electricity.
The experiment was conducted by the Mass Oriented Research and Social Elevation Lab (MORSEL) in
February–May 2013, with a total of 593 households interviewed. The households were randomly chosen
from the 2011 census household list for the two villages. So, while the choice of the two villages was
based on convenience, the sample within those two villages was random. Of the 593 households inter-
viewed, for 401 subjects we also conducted a thorough baseline survey one week before the experiment
was implemented. Unfortunately, we did not have the resources to conduct such a survey for all of the
subjects. All interviews were conducted in the local dialect of Hindi by experienced enumerators from
Uttar Pradesh. The survey company has conducted dozens of surveys and field experiments in India for
academic researchers and all of their enumerators are fully trained and experienced. One of the authors
accompanied the survey team to the field for training and initial interviews in January–February 2013. The
survey team was trained for a full day in Lucknow and one of the authors oversaw the initial interviews
3“Executive Summary Shahjahanpur District.” See http://www.icssr.org/Executive%20Summary%20-%
20Shahjahanpur.pdf. Accessed on March 18, 2014).
11
the next day. During the training and pilot, the entire survey questionnaire was evaluated and revised
for accuracy. Moreover, every enumerator who participated in the study did at least one mock or real
interview of a subject under the supervision of one of the authors.
For our two study villages, electrification rates closely mirror the state average as out of 401 survey
households 282 reported to have access to electricity, still leaving about 30% of the households unelectri-
fied. Electricity tariffs for domestic use in Uttar Pradesh were 348.03 Paise/kWh in 2011–2012, compared
to an average tariff of 321.82 Paise/kWh across all Indian states (Government of India, 2011b: 165). De-
spite recent improvements in electrification, rural villagers are aware of unreliable electricity supply. On
average, households have electricity only available for 14 hours a day, ranging from as little as one hour a
day to almost 24 hours. Similarly, 68% of 100 households for which we have data mention that they expe-
rienced an electricity outage during the last 24 hours, and satisfaction levels with household lighting are
stated to be low as well, with the majority of households being “somewhat dissatisfied” or “very dissatis-
fied.” Anecdotal evidence from our field work is also suggestive of the respondents’ concern for quality
of electricity supply. For instance, one male respondent in his fifties who had an electricity connection
bitterly complained that the government had promised to electrify the villages for years, but now failed to
provide practically any electricity. Power was only available for a few hours in the afternoon when he was
often not at home. At night, when power would have been needed, it was rarely available. This evidence
is important as it ensures that our analysis is not misplaced. The connection between electricity tariffs and
reliable supply is key also to recently electrified villagers.
The basic idea of our experimental test was to elicit interviewees’ responses on four outcome measures
related to electricity markets and electricity pricing in Uttar Pradesh as a function of information provided
by us. While we explain our informational treatments in greater detail below, we randomly assigned each
interviewed household to either a control or one of two treatment groups. The two treatment conditions
are different in that they either emphasize that there is a trade-off between low electricity prices and an
ensuing lack of reliable electricity services (T1) or the notion that electricity is a fundamental right that
has to be provided by the state government of Uttar Pradesh (T2). In view of the theoretical arguments
derived above, the first two hypotheses about the central role of state intervention for the provision of
electricity are purely correlational. Our two treatments, then, aim at putting the three last hypotheses
about higher electricity tariffs to a rigorous experimental test. The first treatment leverages the connection
between increased electricity tariffs and service quality, which provides us with an empirical handle to
directly get at Hypotheses 3 and 4. The second treatment uses a universal rights framing and is thus a
direct experimental test of Hypothesis 5.
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For assessing the empirical effects of these two treatments on outcomes in our survey experiment,
we run two types of analyses. First, we calculate simple pairwise t-tests to test for mean differences in
interviewees’ responses across experimental conditions. Second, we apply regression techniques with the
following regression equation
Outcomei = α+ β1T1i + β2T2i + δ1Interviewerj + δ2Villagek + εi, (1)
where β1 and β2 are the regression coefficients of the dummy variables of the two treatment conditions,
δ1 and δ2 denote interviewer and village fixed effects, and α and εi are the regression intercept and the
individual error term, respectively. Given our five hypotheses above, our main interest lies in coefficients
β1 and β2, which capture the effect that a particular treatment condition has on the outcome variable
relative to the control condition as a baseline. In contrast to a pairwise t-test between the means of the
control and the first treatment group, T1, for instance, the β1 coefficient assesses the effect of being in
this experimental condition net of the effect that being in treatment group T2 has. Positive β coefficients
denote higher expected means than in the control group, while lower β coefficients translate into smaller
expected mean outcomes than in the baseline category.
4.1 Treatments
As mentioned above, the 593 respondents are randomly assigned to any of the following three groups:
control group (N=198), treatment group T1 (N=198), and treatment group T2 (N=197). Table 1 below
summarizes the three experimental conditions and provides the exact wording of the informational treat-
ments which we administered. Survey respondents assigned to the control group did not receive any
informational treatment, whereas households in the first treatment group were informed that unreliable
electricity services are due to low electricity tariffs, which make investment in electricity infrastructure
impossible. In contrast to this price reform treatment, households assigned to the second treatment were
primed that access to electricity is often argued for to be a fundamental right, which is to be provided by
local governments.
[Table 1 about here.]
While the fundamental rights treatment is supposed to increase the respondents’ likelihood to see elec-
tricity provision fall into a local government’s domain as compared to private providers, the price increase
treatment pinpoints the trade-off between electricity prices and reliability of electricity services. The latter
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treatment, thus, puts the claim that poor rural villagers are utterly opposed to increasing electricity tariffs
no matter what to a strong empirical test.
4.2 Outcome Measures
For measuring outcomes, we ask the respondents in our survey experiment to answer four questions,
which are posed right after the experimental treatment (no treatment for control group, price reform
treatment for T1 group, or fundamental rights treatment for T2 group) was administered. The outcome
measures are summarized in Table 2.
[Table 2 about here.]
First, we ask respondents if free supply of electricity to rural households should not be allowed if
this increases the reliability of supply. Second, we ask whether the local Government of Uttar Pradesh
should invest in improved electricity generation capacity even if this comes with an increase in electricity
tariffs. Third, we want to know if electricity markets should be privatized and, finally, if electricity is a
commodity that the state should provide to all Indians. All answers are recorded on a 0–4 scale, where
higher numbers denote stronger agreement, ranging in equal steps from “strongly disagree,” coded as
zero, to “strong agree,” coded as 4. To clarify our expectations, a positive coefficient β1 in regression
models with Outcomes 1 and 2 as dependent variables constitute support for Hypotheses 3 and 4, while
a positive coefficient β2 suggests empirical evidence in favor of the fifth hypothesis in regressions with
Outcome 4 as the dependent variable.
5 Findings
In this findings section, we discuss and detail our results. For this, we present summary statistics and
simple t-tests first, which already provide strong support in favor of our hypotheses. Additionally, we
strengthen the empirical evidence of our theoretical argument by also discussing results based on regres-
sion analysis techniques.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
A major advantage of using an experimental research design is that simple descriptive statistics and
correlation matrices can already be considered first good indicators as to whether our theory finds support
in the data. From the summary statistics, presented in Table 3, we can already get a clear initial glimpse
of what preferences of rural villagers in Uttar Pradesh look like. In fact, our results can be interpreted
as tentative support for Hypotheses 1 to 3. With higher values on the outcome variables translating into
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higher levels of approval, we find that higher electricity prices are strongly supported if this implies better
quality of electricity supply (Outcome 1). Even though support for governmental investment in electricity
generation capacity is more modest (Outcome 2), a mean of 2.62 still indicates that a majority of our
respondents tend to be supportive of this proposition. Both findings align with Hypothesis 3 from above
which argues that Indian people’s support for free electricity supply is low once they are informed that
this has negative consequences for the reliability with which power is supplied.
[Table 3 about here.]
The results on who should provide electricity (the state or the private sector), and thereby testing
Hypotheses 1 and 2, are clear: while privatization and electricity being supplied by markets (Outcome 3)
is essentially disapproved of by interviewees (mean response of 0.82), there is almost universal support
(mean of 3.93) for the claim that electricity is to be provided for all Indians by the state (Outcome 4).
This is consistent with our first two hypotheses on the centrality of state responsibility. Even though, we
cannot draw any inferences as to the effectiveness of our treatments from the summary statistics alone,
these descriptives nonetheless help ascertain the validity of our first three hypotheses.
To further illustrate basic electricity preferences in our sample, the correlation matrix, which is shown
in Table 4, reveals that there is a strong, and positively significant bivariate correlation between Outcomes 1
and 2. This correlation suggests that respondents who oppose free electricity provision as they understand
the negative relationship with service quality are at the same time more supportive of government invest-
ment in electricity infrastructure. This link is important as it testifies to at least some people’s awareness of
the connection between governmental investment, reliable electricity supply, and higher electricity tariffs.
Without seeking to unduly overstate this bivariate correlation, we nonetheless emphasize it as it lends
plausibility to the causal mechanism proposed in our argument.
[Table 4 about here.]
5.2 Simple Statistical Tests
Before presenting regression results, though, we implemented several pairwise t-tests to statistically test
for simple differences in means across treatment and control groups, separated by outcome variable. The
results are shown in Table 5. Compared to our results based on summary statistics alone, t-tests allow us
to examine whether the administered treatments had some effects in systematically changing respondents’
electricity preferences.
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[Table 5 about here.]
From the results, we see that statistically significant differences in means across groups are found
only for our second outcome variable. Hence, respondents from the price reform treatment (T1) and the
fundamental rights treatment (T2) have significantly higher agreement levels than the control group at
p-values of p < 0.001 and p < 0.035, respectively. This provides support for Hypotheses 3 and 4, which
emphasize that respondents’ willingness to pay more grows as the connection between tariffs and service
reliability is recognized. As there is no statistically significant difference between the means from the two
treatment conditions, there seems to be no differential effect from either appealing to a universal rights or
pricing reform argument.
For all the other outcome variables, we cannot identify any effects of our informational treatments.
The means across our experimental groups printed in Table 5 suggest, however, that no such differences
can be detected because the levels of agreement are very similar across the three groups, at least without
controlling for other confounding variables. The largest drawback of using simple t-tests alone is that they
only allow assessing mean differences unconditional on any control variables. To address this point, we
now turn to results from regression analysis.
5.3 Regression Results
We report regression results separately for each outcome variable, shown in Tables 6 to 9, which are all
identical in structure. Models (1) and (2) report results from linear least squares estimation, whereas
Models (3) and (4) use ordered probit as estimation technique to account for the non-normal distribution
of our dependent variable and its clear rank ordering. For each of these two groups of models, the first
model specification only includes the treatment dummies, while the second model is estimated with both
interviewer and village fixed effects. By including fixed effects we make sure that our findings are not
driven by potential village differences across the two villages, Chhite and Toni, in which we conducted the
survey experiment. For similar reasons, we also estimate models with interviewer fixed effects to account
for potential differences akin to the eight interviewers active in the field for our study.
In the supplementary appendix we also present additional model specifications which include up to
four control variables. Importantly, these controls on status of electrification, free market attitudes, and
socio-economic household characteristics were collected as part of a household survey approximately one
week prior to administering treatment and are used to increase the power of our analysis. As we had only
resources to conduct full surveys for 401 households out of 593 to which treatment was administered,
we prefer to present the more parsimonious models here. This decision is innocuous, as our estimation
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results are shown to be qualitatively identical when we apply a covariate control strategy.
For our first outcome variable, it seems that the second, universal rights treatment has virtually no
effect on interviewees’ responses on whether electricity should not be provided for free. The effects are
small in size, are not robust across specifications, and lack statistical significance at any conventional
levels. For the pricing reform treatment, the estimated coefficients are larger in size and are consistently
estimated to be positive. With standard errors of about the same size as the coefficient itself, the estimated
effects fail to be statistically significant. As already discussed above, this weak finding is largely indebted
to the similarity in average response levels across the control and treatment groups. If between-group
differences are minuscule, disentangling treatment effects is difficult given our moderate sample size.
[Table 6 about here.]
Both treatments have strong effects on the second outcome variable. The second treatment is sta-
tistically significant at least at the 10% significance level across all models, which we take as support
for Hypothesis 5. What is more, the pricing reform treatment is highly statistically significant across
all four models, indicating positive empirical evidence for our third and fourth hypotheses. Effect sizes
are non-trivial, as receiving this informational treatment increases the response level by 0.45 according to
Model (1), for instance. Given the 0–4 scale for our response variables, the informational treatment implies
a 10% change on this scale.
[Table 7 about here.]
When turning to the question on whether electricity markets should be privatized, the universal rights
treatment has again a consistently positive effect across all models, suggesting higher preferences for
free markets once the treatment is administered. As these effects lack statistical significance, though,
we caution against a too literal interpretation. Similar positive effects are found for the price reform
treatment; notwithstanding that these coefficients are statistically significant in all models and provide
tentative support for Hypotheses 3 and 4, the coefficient is only about half the size when compared to our
second outcome measure. An additional analysis, which is shown in the supplementary appendix, also
suggests that the treatment effect of the price reform treatment loses statistical significance once we control
for a respondent’s preference for free markets. This accords well with the positive correlation between our
third outcome measure and the control variable (r = 0.109, p ≤ 0.10).
[Table 8 about here.]
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Finally, we find positive but statistically insignificant coefficients for both treatments when considering
the respondents’ preference for electricity being provided by the state. As discussed earlier, with means of
3.90 in the control group and 3.94 in the treatment groups on a 0–4 scale, it is impossible for the treatment
to override any of the villagers’ deeply rooted preferences.
[Table 9 about here.]
The results provide support in favor of the hypotheses. First, there is strong support in favor of
electricity being provided by the state, rather than private firms (Hypotheses 1). Privatization is highly
opposed by villagers in rural Uttar Pradesh (Hypothesis 2). Moreover, once people understand that higher
electricity tariffs are needed to enable SEBs to invest in electricity generation capacity, which allows more
reliable electricity provision, the respondents increasingly support pricing reform. The highest priority
for most of the surveyed villagers, it seems, is reliable power supply. There is public support in favor
of reform of the Indian electricity sector, once the rationale for higher prices is explained properly. New
information about the link between electricity tariffs and service quality creates public support for reform
(Hypotheses 3 and 4).
6 Evidence for External Validity: A National Survey of India, 2004–2005
The main strength of the experimental approach is internal validity. Since we randomized our treatment,
causal effects are properly identified and there is little need to worry about omitted variable bias or
endogeneity. However, the external validity of a survey experiment conducted in a small sample in
two villages may raise some concerns (Barabas and Jerit, 2010). Fortunately a closely related national
survey from the years 2004/2005 is available. Santhakumar (2008) analyzed social opposition to electricity
privatization in the aftermath of the 2003 Electricity Act of India in 13 major Indian states. While his survey
does not contain the exact treatments we are interested in, many of the survey questions are nonetheless
relevant. Therefore, we use the Santhakumar (2008) data to verify the external validity of our results.
The Santhakumar (2008) data contain fairly detailed information about the views and preferences of
people who already have an electricity connection (81% of the sample), while only a few questions were
posed to unelectrified households (19% of the sample). In total, his team conducted 6,241 interviews.
Throughout the analysis, we clearly indicate if the question was presented to the entire sample or only
electrified households.
To begin with, consider people’s perceptions about electricity privatization. Consistent with our ex-
pectations, opposition to privatization was prevalent. Only 17% of the sample supported privatization,
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while 31% expressed a strong preference against privatization. The rest were either indifferent or chose
the “do not know” option. This seems to be largely consistent with our first two hypotheses.
Willingness to pay for improved service quality was also high overall. When inquired about willing-
ness to pay a higher price for electricity, 40% said they were in favor of the proposition. According to
our theory, people should become more willing to pay a higher price if they understand the benefits of
higher electricity prices. Strongly suggestive of this pattern is the fact that 45% of people whose electricity
tariff has increased during the past year support higher prices, while only 41% do so if their tariff has
not increased. The 2-tailed pairwise t-test also indicates that this difference is statistically significant at
the p < 0.05 level (t = 2.36). As expected, the experience with higher tariffs seems to create support for
higher prices, which nicely aligns with our third hypothesis.
Finally, education increases support for higher prices. Since education is positively correlated with
awareness and access to information about environmental and energy issues, this is consistent with our
general theoretical framework (Aklin et al., 2013). In Table 10, we regress the binary indicator for willing-
ness to pay higher prices on years of education and a variety of control variables. In particular, we control
for respondent characteristics, such as age, sex, and whether the respondent is working in agriculture.
At the household level, we include covariates on household assets to proxy for household wealth and
whether the household received government subsidies. We estimate linear probability models as well as
logit models with robust standard errors and district fixed effects. The education effect is positive and
highly statistically significant across all six models. As interpretation is easier in OLS models, in the sim-
pler Model (2) without controls, each year of additional education increases willingness to pay for higher
prices by about 0.7% points, and this effect only drops slightly below half a percentage point in the full
model. In substantive terms, this effect is non-trivial as changing the education variable from its lowest
value (0 years of schooling) to its highest value (21 years of schooling), Model (3) suggests that willingness
to pay rises by about 9% points.
[Table 10 about here.]
To summarize, the Santhakumar (2008) data establish the following points. First, there is strong op-
position to privatization. Second, willingness to pay higher prices for increased supply depends on prior
experience with electricity tariff increases. Finally, willingness to pay grows with additional education.
7 Conclusion
Economic reforms are politically controversial, and the available evidence shows that the public in many
developing countries is deeply suspicious of the liberalization of economic policy (Stokes, 1996; Santhaku-
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mar, 2008; Denisova et al., 2012). In a democratic setting, elites interested in promoting reform must argue
for the merits of the policy change. This article has investigated the effectiveness of rational economic
arguments in the promotion of such a policy.
The Indian power sector offers an excellent setting for answering this question. There is a clear con-
sensus among experts that the Indian power sector is unable to produce enough electricity to meet the
needs of the population, and the root of the problem is in the woeful finances of the power utilities. There-
fore, a pricing reform promises large payoffs. If power utilities can collect enough revenue to cover their
costs, their willingness and ability to pay for power generation capacity grows. Along with investment in
transmission and distribution, this growth effectively mitigates outages and other problems of supply.
To test the effect of new information on preferences, we conducted a survey experiment in rural Uttar
Pradesh. The main finding was that information in favor of reform is a powerful determinant of public
opinion. Given this, it is indeed surprising that information as a policy instrument to build public support
for reform remains currently unused by the regulatory agency in Uttar Pradesh. Compared to the control
group, subjects who were given a simple information package about the importance of higher prices for
reliance were considerably more supportive of price increases. At the same time, though, support for
privatization did not increase. This suggests that people in rural Uttar Pradesh consider the state to be
responsible for power generation, but at the same time they are willing to pay a fee for the service. The
positive, if weaker, effect of a rights treatment further strengthens this interpretation.
The findings have important implications for scholarship on economic reform. If new information
about the benefits of reform shapes public opinion, the question remains why they are not having a
larger effect on policy. One possibility is that politicians offering such arguments face difficulties reaching
their constituencies or must compete with alternative arguments (Aklin and Urpelainen, 2013). Future
research should investigate the vulnerability of pro-reform messages to challenges, which could be equally
powerful, from the anti-reform lobby. As discussed in the introduction, one should also recall that the
mass public does not always play a major role in the politics of economic reform. Some next steps for this
research program would be to identify the conditions under which public opinion does play a decisive
role in the politics of reform and when new information works. These caveats notwithstanding, our results
provide some hope for reform-oriented governments worried about the public legitimacy of their efforts.
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Summary of experimental conditions
Experimental condition Treatment
Control group No treatment text assigned.
Treatment 1 (T1, pricing reform) Many experts argue that the low price of electricity explains why many
households in Uttar Pradesh villages do not have a reliable supply of
power. When the price is low, utilities do not invest in power plants be-
cause the low price does not cover the construction cost. According to these
experts, increasing the price of electricity could provide Uttar Pradesh vil-
lages with a more reliable supply of power.
Treatment 2 (T2, fundamental rights) Many experts argue that access to electricity is a fundamental right for
the Indian people. According to these experts, the state is responsible for
providing everyone in Uttar Pradesh with electricity at an affordable cost.
Table 1: Overview of experimental conditions and the assigned treatment texts for the control
group, the price reform treatment (T1), and the fundamental rights treatment (T2).
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Summary of outcome measures
Outcome group Outcome measure
Outcome 1 (no free provision) Government of Uttar Pradesh should not offer electricity to all rural house-
holds for free, because an electricity tariff that households pay would allow
a more reliable supply.
Outcome 2 (higher prices) Government of Uttar Pradesh should invest in improved electricity gen-
eration capacity, even if doing so means that electricity tariffs have to be
increased.
Outcome 3 (privatization) Electricity markets in India should be privatized, so that the businessmen
who own power plants can freely choose electricity tariffs for their cus-
tomers.
Outcome 4 (state responsibility) Electricity is a commodity that the state should provide for all Indians.
Measurement 0 = Strongly disagree
1 = Disagree
2 = Neutral
3 = Agree
4 = Strongly agree
Table 2: Summary of the four different outcome measures used in our survey experiment.
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Summary statistics
count mean sd min max
Outcome 1 (no free provision) 593 3.31 1.21 0.00 4.00
Outcome 2 (higher prices) 593 2.62 1.36 0.00 4.00
Outcome 3 (privatization) 593 0.82 1.33 0.00 4.00
Outcome 4 (state responsibility) 593 3.93 0.40 0.00 4.00
Control group 593 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Treatment 1 (pricing reform) 593 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Treatment 2 (fundamental rights) 593 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Table 3: Summary statistics.
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Correlation matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Outcome 1 (no free provision) 1.000
(2) Outcome 2 (higher prices) 0.258∗∗∗ 1.000
(3) Outcome 3 (privatization) -0.027 -0.027 1.000
(4) Outcome 4 (state responsibility) 0.076 0.019 -0.078 1.000
(5) Control group -0.025 -0.130∗∗ -0.071 -0.053 1.000
(6) Treatment 1 (pricing reform) 0.043 0.105∗ 0.064 0.027 -0.501∗∗∗ 1.000
(7) Treatment 2 (fundamental rights) -0.018 0.025 0.007 0.026 -0.499∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ 1.000
Table 4: Correlation matrix.
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Descriptive statistics and t-tests
Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4
Condition Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Control 3.26 1.28 2.37 1.41 0.69 1.20 3.90 0.51
Pricing reform treatment (T1) 3.38 1.11 2.82 1.23 0.94 1.42 3.94 0.37
Fundamental rights treatment (T2) 3.27 1.23 2.67 1.37 0.83 1.33 3.94 0.28
Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4
Tested groups Difference p-value Difference p-value Difference p-value Difference p-value
Control vs T1 -0.12 0.337 -0.45 0.000 -0.25 0.057 -0.04 0.318
Control vs T2 -0.01 0.927 -0.40 0.035 -0.14 0.255 -0.04 0.2833
T1 vs T2 0.11 0.377 0.15 0.245 0.11 0.442 0.00 0.993
Table 5: Descriptive statistics and t-tests for all four outcome measures, separated by experimen-
tal condition.
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Outcome 1: UP Government should not provide electricity for free
OLS models Ordered probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 1 (pricing reform) 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.08
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Treatment 2 (fundamental rights) 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Interviewer fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Village fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 593 593 593 593
R2 0.002 0.005
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.005
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: Outcome 1.
Robust standard errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6: Estimation results for OLS and ordered probit regressions for outcome measure 1.
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Outcome 2: UP Government should invest in electricity generation despite price increases
OLS models Ordered probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 1 (pricing reform) 0.45∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)
Treatment 2 (fundamental rights) 0.30∗∗ 0.27∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.22∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11)
Interviewer fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Village fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 593 593 593 593
R2 0.019 0.039
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.014
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: Outcome 2.
Robust standard errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 7: Estimation results for OLS and ordered probit regressions for outcome measure 2.
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Outcome 3: Electricity markets should be privatized
OLS models Ordered probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 1 (pricing reform) 0.25∗ 0.25∗ 0.23∗ 0.24∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Treatment 2 (fundamental rights) 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.15
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Interviewer fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Village fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 593 593 593 593
R2 0.006 0.068
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.041
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: Outcome 3.
Robust standard errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 8: Estimation results for OLS and ordered probit regressions for outcome measure 3.
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Outcome 4: Electricity is a commodity that should be provided by the state
OLS models Ordered probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 1 (pricing reform) 0.05 0.04 0.27 0.23
(0.05) (0.05) (0.25) (0.25)
Treatment 2 (fundamental rights) 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.22) (0.21)
Interviewer fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Village fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 593 593 593 593
R2 0.003 0.021
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.051
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: Outcome 4.
Robust standard errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 9: Estimation results for OLS and ordered probit regressions for outcome measure 4.
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Linear probability models for Santhakumar dataset
OLS models Logit models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Education 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.0478∗∗∗ 0.0240∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0059) (0.0088) (0.0104)
Age 0.0009∗ 0.0051∗
(0.0004) (0.0031)
Male dummy 0.0283∗∗ 0.2089∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0991)
Agriculture 0.0296∗ 0.2224∗∗
(0.0156) (0.1123)
Subsidy payments -0.0282 -0.1943
(0.0196) (0.1210)
Household assets 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.1855∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0276)
District fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 5004 5004 4973 5004 4914 4883
R2 0.002 0.384 0.393
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.307 0.319
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent Variable: Willingness to pay for better supply
Robust standard errors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 10: Estimation results for OLS and logit regressions using the Santhakumar (2008) dataset.
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